Introduction
The doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations in English and Welsh public law has, for the most part, been the product of the Court of Appeal. It was the Court of Appealconsisting of Sedley, Woolf, and Mummery LJJ-that controversially pronounced the existence of the substantive dimension of the doctrine.
1 It was also the Court of Appealoften through the judgments of Laws LJ-that refined the contours of the doctrine in the subsequent decade and a half. 2 Whether the Court of Appeal deserves praise or blame, or both, for its handiwork has been a matter of intense debate in the UK, Commonwealth In this case note, the conclusions reached in Lord Carnwath's judgment are analysed in the context of important current debates about the doctrine. In particular, it is argued that they the Coughlan case in a 'narrow' way. It is argued that Lord Carnwath's judgment ultimately reveals an approach which is-in view of present discussion, experience, and knowledgeboth pragmatic and justified.
The United Policyholders Group Case
The United Policyholders Group 9 case concerned a challenge to a decision from the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago. The appellants were holders of life policies which were issued by an insurance company. That company ran into trouble following a banking crisis in 2009. In 2009, the then government provided assurances that all terms and conditions contained within extant life policy contracts would be fulfilled. These assurances were the basis upon which the appellants claimed to have a legitimate expectation when, following the 2010 election in Trinidad and Tobago, the new government failed to follow through with its predecessor's promises. The appellants argued the new incumbents were legally bound, due to the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations, to act in line with the initial assurances.
That argument succeeded at first instance in the High Court but was unsuccessful in See for instance: Nadarajah (n 2).
Coughlan's Broad Discussion and Narrow Outcome
Lord Carnwath observes that his 'review of Coughlan and the later cases reveals a striking contrast between, on the one hand, the relatively narrow scope of the actual decision in that case, and, on the other, the wide-ranging and open-ended nature of the legal discussion'.
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This statement raises interesting questions.
First, how far is the judgment in Coughlan paradigmatic of the doctrine as it stands now? Nowadays, the status of Coughlan as a seminal case vis-à-vis legitimate expectations and public law is firmly entrenched. This is evidenced by how many key student and practitioner texts still portray Coughlan as the paradigm instance of the application of substantive legitimate expectations. This is also evidenced by how Hughes, in a recent collection on the topic of Landmark Cases in Public Law, offers the following analysis of the case's stature:
[I]t is fair to say that Coughlan identified the boundaries of legitimate expectations, is part of the development of modern broader principles of administrative law, that it set out some guidance, which needed to be refined in subsequent cases (and will continue to be refined), and that it marked a clear turning point in history. Thus Coughlan can be seen to be a lighthouse beaming across the water-providing a level of protection not seen in other cases. It can also be seen to be a flag staking out unchartered territory. And finally it can be seen to be a red and white buoy bobbing along in the sea of administrative law, supporting its own weight, with its head firmly above the water, yet open to new currents and direction.
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Putting aside the case's status in the modern history of public law, what does the judgment in Coughlan really tell us about how the doctrine is actually applied by the courts? I would suggest the correct answer to be: 'not much'.
The Coughlan decision-or at least how it was expressed in the 'wide-ranging and open-ended' judgment-was potentially a high watermark for judicial interventionism in this area. 21 The vast majority of substantive legitimate expectations cases since could be considered as centering on routine bureaucratic issues, in contrast to the high-stakes issues in Coughlan. 22 In addition, the decision in the case itself-despite the Court of Appeal's claim that the implications of their decision were 'financial only' being slightly glib in the highly polycentric context of health resource allocation
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-was narrowly confined to a particular set of facts. As Lord Carnwath explains:
[T]he court emphasised in its application of legal principle to the facts, Coughlan concerned an express promise by the authority for its own purposes, made in unqualified terms to a small group of people with whom it had an established relationship, and relied on by them, and given for the specific purpose of persuading them to move out of premises which the authority wished to have available for other purposes.
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Perhaps more importantly than these reasons, the courts have now, across sixteen years of case law, set out detailed guidance about how legality is to be determined where a substantive expectation has been disappointed. 30 If one was to advance a claim about a legal principle usurping the decision-making powers of public authorities, it would be of great concern-perhaps of greater concern than what is merely said in judgments-to build a detailed account about the extent to which such powers are actually usurped in practice through the outcomes of cases. This is especially so given that one does not have to be a hardline legal realist to acknowledge that the form of common law judgments is a somewhat artificial mode of communication. 31 There is no detailed empirical study of the impact of legitimate substantive expectations cases-though such a study would be of great value. If one was to venture an observation on outcomes, it would be that it is fairly difficult to find cases where substantive legitimate expectations arguments have succeeded, and more difficult still to find cases where the court have actually directed the public authority concerned to uphold the expectation. In fact, it is highly likely that there are, collectively, more monographs, journal articles, and Lord Carnwath also ventures into more theoretical territory. Among the controversies surrounding substantive legitimate expectations, there has been a persistent strand of criticism that the doctrine suffers from the absence of a clear conceptual footing. 33 In recent years, it has become almost de rigueur to suggest that such clarity is lacking. In scholarship, there have been two broad lines of criticism concerning the doctrine's lack of a coherent conceptual basis. First, it has been suggested that the doctrine's lack of a clear normative purpose renders it 'little more than a smokescreen for an erratic and subjective assortment of judicial ideas'. 34 Second, it is also suggested that the doctrine would be assisted by identification of some sort of overarching 'meta-value'
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that would 'provide invaluable guidance to difficult questions concerning the scope and effect of the doctrine'. It may, however, be unnecessary to search for deep constitutional underpinning for a principle, which, on a narrow view of Coughlan, simply reflects a basic rule of law and human conduct that promises relied on by others should be kept. This applies in public law as in private law, unless the authority can show good policy reasons in the public interest for departing from their promise.
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The apparent simplicity of this dictum belies the strength of the claim it advances.
While it is perfectly valid to reflect upon whether a particular legal principle, new or old, possesses virtue, 44 to pursue the identification of some sort of overarching 'meta-value'
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that would 'provide invaluable guidance to difficult questions concerning the scope and effect of the doctrine' 46 seems to be misguided for various reasons. It is, as Daly has observed, only normal that the 'doctrine may not map clearly onto the various justifications offered for it from time to time'. 47 Identifying some sort of meta-value that the doctrine ought to serve also risks foreclosing nuanced judicial consideration of the issues presented in a particular case.
Furthermore, such a theoretical exercise may be representative of a worrying 'rationalistic propensity among public lawyers to prioritise the universal over the local, the uniform over the particular and, ultimately, principle over practice'. such an exercise may provide the attractive impression of structure, clarity, certainty, and comprehensiveness within the doctrine, 49 but the courts would inevitably move away from such an abstract stricture when 'seeking to develop a knack and feel' for how the newlyrationalised version of the doctrine would actually work in practice. 50 In this respect, Lord
Carnwath's caution that it may be 'unnecessary to search for deep constitutional underpinning for a principle … which … simply reflects a basic rule of law and human conduct' ought to be heeded.
The Trend of Modern Authority
Lastly, Lord Carnwath offers an interesting discussion about what he sees as the scope of the modern doctrine:
[T]he trend of modern authority, judicial and academic, favours a narrow interpretation of the Coughlan principle, which can be simply stated. Where a promise or representation, which is 'clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification', has been given to an identifiable defined person or group by a public authority for its own purposes, either in return for action by the person or group, or on the basis of which the person or group has acted to its detriment, the court will require it to be honoured, unless the authority is able to show good reasons, judged by the court to be proportionate, to resile from it. In judging proportionality the court will take into account any conflict with wider policy issues, particularly those of a 'macro-economic' or 'macro-political' kind. Lord Carnwath's characterisation of the 'narrow interpretation' of Coughlan as 'the trend of modern authority, judicial and academic' is fair insofar as it is very much the middle ground between sceptics and proponents. A 'trend' is not, however, consensus. One's view of whether a 'narrow interpretation' approach to substantive expectations is good or not (and even the prior question of whether it is 'narrow' or not) will inevitably hinge upon how one conceives as the appropriate relationship between the courts and executive. This well-worn observation-that 'behind every theory of administrative law there lies a theory of the state'
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-is almost as old as the study of administrative law itself in the English jurisdiction.
In terms of how various contested theories of administrative law may offer practical guidance as to the correct approach to substantive legitimate expectations, the profundity of that
Sisyphean task is matched only by its uselessness in offering immediate, helpful answers. For now, then, a useful and defensible approach to substantive legitimate expectations must be the aim. With this goal in mind, Lord Carnwath's judgment reveals an approach which is-in view of present discussion, experience, and knowledge-both pragmatic and justified.
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